Political leaders have paid close attention to available energy supplies because of strong links between growth in energy consumption and the economy. The crucial role of fossil fuels in supporting mechanized warfare has further sharpened the politicians' focus. The uneven distribution of fossil fuel resources across the globe has forced national leaders to treat energy as a strategic commodity.
Energy security, therefore, has been a common rationale for governmental actions over the past century. I use Yergin's definition: "The objective of energy security is to assure adequate, reliable supplies of energy at reasonable prices and in ways that do not jeopardize major national values and objectives" [2, p. 111] . In this article, a brief examination of the histories of oil and electricity confirms that unfettered markets do not ensure adequate energy security, that rationales for governmental intervention have evolved over time, and that economic and political interests have been inextricably interlinked throughout.
The energy security lens also has significant implications in the current policy debate over the "hydrogen economy."
Brief History of Oil
Like many resource markets, the market for petroleum suffers from dramatic and persistent price volatility. Demand is unresponsive to price in the short run, yet growth in supply is lumpy and capitalintensive, and hence it is difficult to balance demand and supply. Natural equilibrium is unlikely, so both consumers and producers seek external interventions that improve price stability. When the oil era took off in the late 19 th century, "John D. Rockefeller's original solution to the problem of price volatility was to establish a monopoly" [3, p. 2] .
Gillespie and Henry [3, p. 3 ] identify five successive oil regimes: 1) the Standard Oil monopoly, broken up in 1911; 2) the Texas Railroad Commission's internationally influential pro-rationing of production, starting in the 1930s; 3) the partly contemporaneous Seven Sisters cartel consisting of Exxon, Shell, British Petroleum, Mobil, Chevron, Texaco, and Gulf, which lasted into the 1970s; 4) the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Counties (OPEC) that started in 1960 but became effective only briefly during the 1970s-1980s; and 5) the Saudi-American regime under whose twilight years we currently are living.
Politicians helped create and preserve these oil regimes at every turn [3] , [4] . Rockefeller depended on compliant, laissez-faire legislators for Standard Oil's monopoly. The Texas Railroad Commission, by 1935 an elected body beholden to small independent oil producers, was able to use pro-rationing quotas to establish price floors that also benefited the international majors for over 40 years. The Seven Sisters, although they relied on an interlocking set of private contracts to enforce stable market shares and prices, also depended on British and American governmental interventions to prevent producing countries from nationalizing their oil. OPEC, conversely, depended on governmental enforcement of national production quotas. The Saudi-American regime depends on the Saudi willingness to be a swing producer and an American willingness to intervene militarily in a politically unstable part of the world.
Political interest in this economic commodity is not merely cynicalit is also prudent. In oil consuming countries, "shocks -interruptions, disruptions and manipulations of supply -can lead to sudden, sharp increases in prices and can impose heavy economic and political costs" [2, p. 122] . For example, two thirds of U.S. oil consumption is currently for transportation, and demand is extremely inelastic because few ready substitute fuels exist [5] . In oil producing countries, petroleum sales may represent the vast majority of foreign exchange earnings, so a drop in prices or quantities creates economic and political chaos. Table I summarizes recent oil export and import dependence statistics for selected countries. Over the past century, the United States has gone from being the world's predominant oil supplier to being its largest importer. Much of the U.S. angst over energy security in recent decades comes from its change in status into a significant net importer, as shown in [7] . Japan and most European countries have always imported almost all of the oil they consumed, and they have long since adapted their economies and policies. China became a net importer in 1993, and imports grew to about 2 million barrels per day by 2002 [8] . from Middle Eastern oil towards oil elsewhere, and towards coal, natural gas, and other fuels, while also greatly increasing their energy efficiency. Third, importing countries developed strategic petroleum reserves to carry them through short-term supply disruptions. Fourth and arguably most important, the IEA developed a worldwide information system that vastly increased the transparency of the oil market and allowed it to adapt quickly and accurately to changing conditions [11] .
Oil Security
Conditions have also changed dramatically on the supply side since 1973. Although Middle Eastern countries continue to hold the vast majority of reserves, they currently represent only 28% of global production, down from 37% in 1973 [14] . Non-Middle eastern and non-OPEC producers have ramped up production and greatly diversified the geography of oil supply. Although geological determinists correctly point out that this is a short-term phenomenon [15] , this "quick fix" is already entering its fourth helpful decade.
The history of oil shows that an economic view of energy security has predominated over the past century, with two exceptions. Starting in World War I with the advent of oil-fueled warfare, and reaching its peak in World War II, "oil not only determined capabilities, but also defined strategic objectives" [2, Sources: [9] [10] [11] [12] 
Electricity
The electricity sector also explicitly sought governmental involvement during its development, and by the 1930s it was widely accorded public utility status [18] . Electricity supply is capital-intensive, storage is minimal, transmission and distribution are intrusive, and until recently price signals have been weak. As a remedy to under-financing in most of the world, electricity has been supplied by public enterprises or regulated private enterprises that have been granted monopoly franchises [19] . Recent deregulatory efforts have reduced but not eliminated a governmental role [20] . Security concerns for electricity have focused mostly on adequacy of supply (is there enough capacity?) and reliability of operations (are all of the components functioning properly?). In wartime, and recently with the increase in terrorist threats, security of the physical and informational infrastructures also has received attention.
The primary sources of electrical energy are quite diverse, currently including coal, oil, gas, biomass, hydropower, nuclear, wind, geothermal, and solar. Each source has strengths and weaknesses. Renewables are the great hope of many, and they represent the most rapidly growing element of the electrical energy mix. Unit costs have dropped by an order of magnitude for wind and solar since the 1970s, and wind is now economically viable [21] , [22] . Enthusiasts argue that the diffuse renewable resources and decentralized locations of solar panels and wind turbines makes such power sources inherently more secure than large, central station power plantsthe targets are dispersed. It remains an open issue whether distributed generation can be financed and operated as cost-effectively as central station power plants.
Nuclear power adds one more dimension to the security picture. It beneficially provides an alternative to fossil fuels, but imposes nuclear weapons proliferation risks as well as offering attractive physical targets for saboteurs. There is a strong case favoring continued investment in nuclear power innovations, but only if the associated proliferation and security risks can be resolved [23] .
Concern over the physical security of energy facilities needs to be kept in perspective [24] - [26] . A strategy of eliminating all large targets would mean eliminating aspects of civilization we value highly, such as our great cities and monuments. Following September 11, 2001 , advocates of sprawling suburban land use patterns argued that central cities should wither away because they were not defendable. Abandoning all central station power plants for the same reason sounds equally nonsensical.
U.S. Energy Policy Rationales
A scan of recent headlines can confirm that there are multiple rationales for governmental intervention in the energy economy. Concerns over air pollution, global warming, energy prices, adequacy and reliability of supplies, foreign trade deficits of energy importing nations, and military adventurism get continual play, decade after decade. To illustrate, following are the objectives of a half-century of U.S. federal energy policies as paraphrased from the U.S. Depart- Rationales for governmental intervention have evolved over time.
into more modest roles, and they are learning to trust the marketplace again [13] , [28] . Others see pendulums swinging back and forth between consumer and producer interests [29] , [30] , or between a centralized "hard" energy path and a decentralized "soft" path [31] , [32] .
Classical Rationales for Governmental Action
Given the 20 th century experience with communism and fascism, a reasonable starting point for 21 st century public policy might be Hippocrates: "above all, do no harm" [33, p.43] . Inspired by the 18 th century laissez faire advocate Adam Smith, who wanted government to be no more than a night watchman for the economy, classical liberals have argued that government should serve only as rule maker and umpire for the economic game [34] .
Practical minimalists say that government should only intervene in the marketplace for three reasons: to improve allocational efficiency, distributional equity, and macro stability [35] . The efficiency rationale is all about correcting market failures. In the energy sector, the most important of these are monopoly power (as enjoyed by electric utilities, for example), externalities (especially the environmental damage caused by extracting and burning fossil fuels), and public goods (providing things like national security and basic research which the unfettered marketplace under-provides). The equity rationale justifies "lifeline" electricity and gas rates and assistance to help low-income families pay heating bills. The macro stability rationale justifies interventions to manage foreign trade decifits, inflation, and the economy-wide balance between consumption and investment.
Others see a larger role for government, and the evidence certainly shows that governments frequently act in order to enforce national norms, pursue national objectives, and cater to special interests [28] , [36] - [39] . For energy, the essential tension is not merely whether it is an economic issue to be managed in the marketplace or a political issue to be managed by government -it is often, more subtly, whether a particular problem is an economic issue to be managed by government.
Actual governmental interventions in the energy economy come in many flavors, and they typically address multiple objectives. Indeed, the historical record shows that security on its own has dictated only a few actions: establishing strategic petroleum reserves, increasing the diversity of sources of energy supplies, and physically protecting energy infrastructures and supplies. 
The Special Role of Energy Carriers
Electricity is an energy carrier, meaning that it transforms diverse primary energy sources such as coal and nuclear energy into a clean, convenient, easy-to-deliver form for final use. This carrier has proved to be of immense value to the macro-economy for allowing the diversification of energy supplies. In response to the oil price spikes of the 1970s, the U.S. electricity sector, for example, diversified away from oil towards coal and eventually natural gas to such an extent that it is visible in the multi-century graph in Fig. 1 . It is fair to say that electricity reversed decline in the U.S. coal industry by preventing oil and gas from competitively displacing the dirty, high-carbon fuel, and the nation now burns far more coal than it did at the height of the industrial revolution. This substantial shift away from oil was accelerated by a shift towards an increased share for electricity of end use consumption.
Hydrogen is being proposed as an energy carrier for mobile and cogeneration applications, just as electricity has served so successfully an energy carrier for stationary applications. Hydrogen is a cleanburning gas that can be produced from a variety of primary sources and delivered to the point of use. In particular, proponents of fuel cell technology hope that hydrogen emerges as a viable energy carrier because other potential feedstocks such as methanol require processing before use [40] . Given that transportation today depends almost exclusively on petroleumbased fuels, and viable substitutes do not seem to be at hand, advocates hope that hydrogen offers a solution to oil import dependence.
There is a high thermodynamic cost in the near-term of using hydrogen as an energy carrier. Most current U.S. hydrogen is produced by reforming natural gas, although some is also created by electrolyzing water [41] . Both reforming and electrolysis are relatively inefficient processes with unappetizing theoretical engineering efficiency limits [40] . One can argue that low engineering efficiency only matters when consuming non-renewable fossil fuels, and it should not be a concern when using abundant renewable energy. However, if that renewable energy can be more efficiently converted to an alternative energy carrier-electricity-then turning it into hydrogen may not be cost-competitive [42] .
Electricity systems themselves are not very energy-efficient. Fossil fuel-fired power plants convert only about 30-50% of the heating value of the fuel into electricity; then resistance losses within transmission and distribution systems impose an additional tax of about 10% [18] . Yet ubiquitous electricity systems demonstrate that we are willing to sacrifice much thermodynamic efficiency in exchange for cleanliness and convenience at the point of use. The same may someday be true for a hydrogen energy carrier: this is the compelling logic of economic efficiency, not engineering efficiency.
Some types of environmental impacts -greenhouse gas emissions, for example -tend to track engineering efficiency very closely, so that lower losses at any stage in the system lead to lower emissions, all else being equal [41] . Other types of environmental impactssulphur dioxide emissions, for example -can be mitigated by fuel substitution or flue gas scrubbing, and hence they do not closely track engineering efficiency [43] . The most reliable and cost-effective current multi-pollutant mitigation strategies tend to include efficiency improvements as a key element [44] . However, single-pollutant strategies such as carbon sequestration may have a future role [41] . Carbon sequestration systems now under development could capture carbon at a fossil fueled power plant and deliver it to underground cavities or the deep ocean for permanent storage, while adding roughly 50% to the cost of the electricity so generated [45] .
Energy carriers may also impose security-environment tradeoffs precisely because they facilitate fuel diversification. Just as electricity has increased dirty coal usage, so a hydrogen carrier could increase the use of various fossil fuels.
The Hydrogen Case
Current policy debate over the "hydrogen economy" illustrates the interplay of rationales for governmental intervention in the energy marketplace. Elements of the hydrogen vision include hydrogen-consuming fuel cells for mobile, stationary, and appliance uses; hydrogen production technologies; and a vast hydrogen delivery infrastructure. All elements exist today but they do not perform satisfactorily and are not yet in widespread use. Competing visions vie for attention: some advocate a centralized solution involving hydrogen produced by nuclear or coal-fired power plants and delivered by continental networks of hydrogen pipelines. Others advocate a decentralized solution in which hydrogen is produced by local renewables or by natural gas that is reformed at the point of end use.
At a recent conference, a former U.S. Congressional leader [46] listed the anticipated benefits of moving toward a hydrogen economy:
■ improved access to unlimited amounts of energy; ■ geopolitical advantages to consumer nations due to increased energy independence; ■ distributed power, which aligns with a megatrend toward decentralization, customization, and security (dispersed targets); ■ reduced environmental impacts of transportation because hydrogen fuel cells emit only water vapor; and ■ spurred creation of higher quality products such as cars that can double as power plants or laptop computers with very long-lasting power supplies.
The barriers to achieving a hydrogen economy include:
■ Mostly negative public perceptions of hydrogen (Hindenberg explosion, H-bomb, hydrogen bubble at the Three Mile Island nuclear accident); ■ Need for substantial investments in hydrogen research and production technology; ■ Need for the creation of a ubiquitous hydrogen delivery infrastructure; and the ■ High cost of fuel cells and hydrogen production technologies.
Skeptics [47] - [49] advocate instead for higher efficiency vehicles and appliances, and increased basic research funding for new primary energy sources such as photobiologically produced hydrogen. Some even say that electricity is the only universal energy carrier needed in the near term [42] . The skeptics have engineering efficiency arguments on their side, as Table II suggests. Whether they also have economic arguments on their side depends in part on how we count benefits and costs.
Many of the necessary technologies for a hydrogen transition are immature and costly in comparison with conventional fuels and prime movers. Thus the current hydrogen value proposition is extremely unattractive for most energy users. A variety of technology roadmap studies [40] , [41] , [50]- [52] suggest that 50% and greater cost reductions are needed before hydrogen and fuel cells can compete successfully in the automotive market.
The calculus changes dramatically if security-related benefits are included. Suppose that energy security represented 50% of the rationale for the American war on Iraq in [2003] [2004] (the spectrum of views on this matter ranges from 0 to 100%). A well-regarded study of the likely costs of invading and occupying Iraq places the costs to the United States in a range from $99 billion to $1,924 billion over the decade following the war [53] . Included are direct military costs, occupation and peacekeeping, reconstruction and nation-building, humanitarian assistance, impacts on oil markets, and macroeconomic impacts. Direct U.S. governmental expenditures as of this writing exceed $120 billion [54] , suggesting that $200 billion is a plausible central estimate of the Iraq invasion's overall cost to the U.S. economy. Fifty percent of that amount is $100 billion. In comparison, the United States has spent an average of $21 billion annually on Persian 12% losses between oil well and filling station 38% efficiency of engine 20% losses in automatic transmission from engine to wheels 12% losses between gas well and reformer 30% losses in reformer from methane to hydrogen 10% losses for compression of hydrogen 10% losses for distribution of gaseous hydrogen 3% losses for hydrogen transfer 50% for conversion to electricity in fuel cells 10% parasitic losses for the hydrogen fuel cell system 10% electric losses in the drive train between battery and wheels 65% thermal losses of power plant 10% losses between power plant and electrolyzer or recharger 8% losses in small home-based AC/DC battery chargers 20% losses for battery charging and discharging 10% bonus for regenerative braking 50% efficiency with internal reforming and diesel fuel 5% parasitic losses for the SOFC system Full system efficiency (multiply row elements) Electric car recharged by wind farm [60] Hybrid electric car with Diesel-fuelled solid oxide fuel cell as range extender [60] Gulf oil imports in recent years [55] Environmental costs and benefits of a switch to hydrogen are indeterminate, depending on whether it is "dirty" or "clean" hydrogen. Dirty hydrogen is produced from fossil fuels at a low full system efficiency, and contributes to global warming as well as local environmental problems associated with the extraction and delivery of fossil fuels. Clean hydrogen is produced from renewable sources at higher full system efficiencies, and with fewer harmful environmental impacts. The only sure environmental benefits come from avoided air pollution at the point of use, the avoided direct health costs of which alone are on the order of $100 million annually for a place like New Jersey, USA, with a mostly suburban population of about 8 million [56] .
Rifkin harbors rather more subversive hopes for hydrogen [57] . He argues that great human transitions happen when a new energy source (distributed renewable generation) becomes available in conjunction with a new communication mechanism (the internet), leading to a densification of human exchange. By analogy, we would need to reconfigure the electric grid to allow peer-to-peer energy flows. But since renewables are intermittent energy sources (no solar power at night, no wind power when it's calm), we need an energy storage carrier: hydrogen. Bottom up and top down forces will interact uneasily to make distributed generation work. The current U.S. vision of the hydrogen economy is centralized and fossil fuel based, whereas the European vision is decentralized and renewable. To promote democracy we need to decentralize control over energy and collectively organize energy consumers. Then, hopes Rifkin, the hydrogen economy can promote a better world by means of "reglobalization from the bottom up."
The potential importance of hydrogen as an energy carrier can be overstated, but it nevertheless appears significant. Energy security by means of oil import substitution is the primary goal of current OECD country hydrogen policies, with environmental benefits secondary.
Energy Security as a Policy Driver
Energy security persists as a policy driver of great rhetorical and practical importance. Although the world is not yet short of petroleum, its concentration in a few politically unstable areas already has profound effects. The United States has recently demonstrated its willingness to spend a full year's worth of world oil industry revenues on regime change in Iraq. Governments could instead spend similar amounts-perhaps just as wastefully but with less loss of human life-on the development of energy efficiency technologies, alternative domestic energy sources and perhaps even new energy carriers like hydrogen.
For a century now, importing nations have done whatever it takes to ensure a continuing flow of energy to fuel their economies. The continuing troubled geopolitics of oil confirms the salience of the security rationale. Ensuring access to oil and gas has been an element of -but never the sole justification for -many military and diplomatic interventions in the Middle East, and to a lesser extent in Southeast Asia and Latin America [4] , [16] .
The security rationale tells governments to act, but doesn't specify how. There are lots of possible responses. Balanced public policy should optimize across security, economic, and environmental criteria, and not maximize any one criterion. This is the crux of current policy debates -is there a way to achieve energy security without jeopardizing other major national values and objectives? One solution, self-sufficiency, is an economically costly strategy that also deprives energy exporting nations of needed trade opportunities. Another solution, increasing the diversity of energy supplies, is beneficial for security and economic stability, but not necessarily for the environment. A related solution, supporting hydrogen as an energy carrier, has related weaknesses.
Policymakers will never find the "sweet spot" that balances security, economic, and environmental interests until there is more agreement that these are all equally valid national values and objectives. Thus, the hydrogen economy solution will face vocal opposition until public policy settles on the "clean" (rather than "dirty") hydrogen pathway. Ideological debate over the decentralization of energy production likewise merely polarizes. We would be better served by wider experimentation that identifies practical and balanced solutions.
Author Information
Clinton Andrews is Associate Professor and Director of the Program in Urban Planning and Policy Development, E.J. Bloustein School of Planning and Public Policy, Rutgers University, 33 Livingston Ave, New Brunswick, NJ 08901; email: c.j.andrews@ieee.org.
